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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 18-1564 
___________ 
 
MATTHEW JONES, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE;  
THE STATE OF DELAWARE; DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-17-cv-00995) 
District Judge:  Honorable Richard G. Andrews 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 16, 2018 
Before:  SHWARTZ, KRAUSE, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  September 17, 2018) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Pro se Appellant Matthew Jones appeals from the dismissal of his complaint as 
frivolous, and because it sought monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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such relief.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (iii).1  For the following reasons, we will 
affirm the judgment.   
Jones filed a complaint seeking $2 billion in damages against the Attorney General 
of Delaware, the State of Delaware, and the Delaware Department of Justice.  As the 
District Court noted, the complaint is a “rambling, disjointed biography of Jones’ life,” in 
which he claims that he was kidnapped by the Delaware State Police at birth, and has 
been “imprisoned illegally” since then for “sexual reasons.”  He claims that the 
defendants have “attempted to murder me and assaulted me,” and are responsible for his 
“misdiagnosis [as suffering from schizophrenia] and malicious care.”  As a basis for his 
action, he lists two criminal statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1035 (“False statements relating to 
health care matters”) & 2251 (“Sexual exploitation of children”), and the Fifth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.   
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise de novo review 
over dismissals under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), see Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d 
Cir. 2003), and over legal determinations regarding immunity, see Dotzel v. Ashbridge, 
438 F.3d 320, 324-25 (3d Cir. 2006).  A complaint is frivolous where it relies on an 
“indisputably meritless legal theory,” such as where the defendants are “immune from 
suit.”  Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).  
We agree with the District Court that Jones’ claims against the defendants are 
barred by the Eleventh Amendment, which protects a state or state agency from suit, 
                                              
1 Jones was granted in forma pauperis (IFP) status pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.   
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unless Congress has specifically abrogated the state's immunity or the state has waived its 
own immunity.  See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 
(1984); Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 661 F.2d 23, 25-26 (3d Cir. 1981); see also Will v. Mich. 
Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (concluding that a suit against a state 
official in his or her official capacity is a suit against the official's office, and as such is 
no different than a suit against the state itself).  Because Delaware has not waived its 
Eleventh Amendment immunity, the claims against these defendants were subject to 
dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). 
We perceive no error in the District Court’s determination that amendment of the 
complaint would have been futile, as there are no factual allegations from which we can 
infer that Jones could have an actionable claim for relief.  See Maiden Creek Assocs. v. 
U.S. Dep't of Transp., 823 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 2016) (noting that review of a district 
court’s futility determination is de novo).   
Based on the foregoing,  we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.   
 
